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Abstract Domestic chickens are members of an order,
Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our
understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social
complexity. At least some birds are now known to be on
par with many mammals in terms of their level of intelli-
gence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction.
Yet, views of chickens have largely remained unrevised by
this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the peer-re-
viewed scientific data on the leading edge of cognition,
emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring
such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning
and self-control, and comparing their abilities in these
areas with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly
mammals. My overall conclusion is that chickens are just
as cognitively, emotionally and socially complex as most
other birds and mammals in many areas, and that there is a
need for further noninvasive comparative behavioral
research with chickens as well as a re-framing of current
views about their intelligence.
Keywords Chicken cognition  Gallus domesticus 
Sentience Intelligence  Social complexity 
Communication
Introduction
When asked to think of an example of a bird, most people
do not think of chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) (Malt
and Smith 1984). And when people see photographs of
domestic chickens behaving like other birds (e.g., roosting
in tree tops), it is often cause for surprise and amusement.
Why? With over 19 billion worldwide, chickens are the
most abundant of all domesticated animals (UN Food and
Agricultural Organisation 2011), so this perception of
chickens is not due to unfamiliarity with them per se.
Rather, the answer may lie with the context in which we
usually encounter them and how their use interacts with
perceptions of their intelligence.
Unlike many other birds, chickens are categorized as a
commodity, devoid of authenticity as a real animal with an
evolutionary history and phylogenetic context. Thus,
arguably, perceptions of chickens shape their use as com-
modities which, in turn, then reinforces those original
perceptions. Animals are typically classified according to
the kinds of attributes they possess (Mervis and Rosch
1981), and the contexts in which we usually encounter
animals shape our views of how representative we think
they are of a more general category (Malt and Smith 1984).
When asked to rate the typicality of chickens as a member
of the more general category of birds, raters usually give
chickens a low score indicating that they are not considered
typical birds (Malt and Smith 1984). Therefore, even
considerations of birds in general may not apply very well
to chickens.
And while many factors are involved in determining
attitudes toward other animals, a number of studies have
shown that belief in sentience or ‘‘mind’’ is a strong pre-
dictor of attitudes toward different types of animal use
(Hills 1995; Knight and Barnett 2008; Knight et al. 2004;
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Phillips and McCulloch 2005). Chickens are misperceived
as lacking most of the psychological characteristics we
recognize in other intelligent animals and are typically
thought of as possessing a low level of intelligence com-
pared with other animals (Eddy et al. 1993; Nakajima et al.
2002; Phillips and McCulloch 2005).
Indeed, the very idea of chicken psychology is strange to
most people. A recent study showed that when college
students were given the opportunity to learn about and
personally train chickens (using positive reinforcement),
their attitudes shifted in a more informed and positive
direction. Student perceptions of chicken intelligence were
assessed pre- and post-training. Relative to their initial
perceptions of chickens as slow learners, the students’
attitudes shifted to viewing them as intelligent and emo-
tional animals with individual personalities. Interestingly,
even pre-training, most students agreed that chickens could
feel hunger, pain, and fear, but were less likely to believe
chickens could feel more complex emotions, such as
boredom, frustration, and happiness. However, boredom,
frustration, and happiness were the emotional states with
the greatest shifts in student attitudes post-training (Hazel
et al. 2015).
The scientific literature on chicken cognition and
behavior is relatively sparse in many areas, and dominated
by applied themes, artificial settings, and methodologies
relating to their ‘‘management’’ as a food source. In other
studies, their welfare is ultimately related to productivity.
Far less numerous are studies of chickens on their own
terms—as birds, within an evolutionary and comparative
framework. But even basic comparative studies of birds
have been limited by concentrating almost exclusively on
associative learning, discrimination, and adaptive special-
izations (such as seed caching), while interest in the evo-
lution of complex intelligence has been focused mostly on
primates, dolphins, elephants, and only certain birds, such
as corvids (crows) and psittacines (parrots) (Emery 2006).
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore
why this might be, arguably even the scientific community
has been influenced by public perceptions of chickens as
cognitively simple. Cognitive differences among species
do indeed exist, but the fact that studies of very basic
associative processes tend to focus on pigeons (Columba
livia) and chickens (two species who are considered quite
atypical as birds and not extremely favored), while studies
of more complex cognitive processes, including language-
like capacities and tool use, involve corvids and parrots,
may have so far precluded chickens from demonstrating
more complex cognition. As will be demonstrated in this
paper, chicken intelligence appears to have been underes-
timated and overshadowed by other avian groups. This
asymmetry in the literature is likely a reflection of, as well
as a contributor to, the disconnect scientists and the public
have between chickens as commodities and who they
actually are as individuals.
But chickens have much in common with other avian
species. Now, more than ever, this simple realization has a
special relevance because of the recent transformation in
our scientific knowledge of birds in general. In the past few
years, numerous studies have shown that there is no ‘‘bright
line’’ between ‘‘avian’’ and ‘‘mammalian’’ intelligence and
complexity; complex intelligence is found in both birds,
mammals, and also fish (Brown 2015; Butler 2008; Emery
2006). Likewise, the brains of birds have historically been
viewed as simpler and more primitive than those of
mammals. However, that assumption about avian brains
has now been overturned by more recent studies showing
that there are many functional similarities in the brains of
birds and mammals, allowing for similar cognitive abili-
ties. In particular, the avian forebrain (the part of the brain
involved in problem-solving and other higher-order cog-
nitive capacities) is actually derived from the same neu-
roanatomical substrate as the mammalian forebrain,
providing more potential evidence for similar cognitive
capacities in the two groups (Jarvis et al. 2005).
In this paper, I review the evidence from peer-reviewed
applied and basic comparative studies of chicken cognition,
emotion, and sociality. I place a special focus on more
complex capacities which appear to be at the leading edge
of intelligence in birds and other animals and only review
some of the more fundamental perceptual and cognitive
abilities in order to understand the mechanisms underlying
these more complex capacities. A recent book on the
behavioral biology of chickens by Nicol (2015) is recom-
mended for a much more comprehensive and wide-ranging
description of studies of chicken cognition and behavior.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to gain a
better understanding of the minds of chickens from the best
scientific literature, separating fact from fiction; two, to
identify compelling areas for future noninvasive research.
Moreover, as with any taxonomic group, species-specific
factors, such as evolutionary history and sensory abilities,
need to be taken into account in order to interpret findings
on cognition, emotion, sociality, and other characteristics
and to make better informed comparisons across taxa.
Therefore, what follows is a brief description of evolution,
phylogeny, and domestication, as well as sensory systems,
in chickens.
Evolution, phylogeny, and domestication
Domestic chickens descended from red jungle fowl (Gallus
gallus). They are considered a subspecies of their wild
counterparts, who inhabit field edges, groves, and scrub-
land in India and southeast Asia (Al-Nasser et al. 2007).
128 Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147
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The domestication of the red jungle fowl was well estab-
lished by 8000 years ago (West and Zhou 1988), but
molecular studies suggest it could have begun as early as
58,000 years ago (Sawai et al. 2010).
Despite their long history of domestication, domestic
chickens remain similar to their wild counterparts despite
the recent very intense breeding and genetic manipulation
directed toward production traits such as egg laying and
growth (Rauw et al. 1998; Appleby et al. 2004). There is no
evidence, for instance, that the cognitive or perceptual
abilities of domestic chickens have been substantially
altered by domestication. It is interesting to note that most
animals domesticated for food, such as pigs and chickens,
are behaviorally and cognitively quite similar to their
ancestors and wild counterparts as they are mainly selected
on physical characteristics like rate of growth, fecundity,
percentage of body fat, etc. (Held et al. 2009). This stands
in contrast to the case of dogs and wolves, who, of course,
share a number of characteristics with each other but,
because dogs were selected as companions, are also dis-
tinctly different on several key cognitive and behavioral
dimensions (Udell et al. 2010). The implications for dif-
ferential welfare for dogs versus chickens (and other
farmed animals) in a ‘‘domesticated’’ setting are evident.
Social groups of jungle fowl and wild or free-ranging
domestic chickens usually consist of one dominant male
and one dominant female, subordinates of both sexes, and
chicks, all occupying a home range during the breeding
season (Appleby et al. 2004). Within their home range,
they have regular roosting sites, including high up in the
branches of trees (Appleby et al. 2004). Diet is highly
varied and ranges from berries and seeds to insects and
small vertebrates (Savory et al. 1978). Interestingly, despite
the fact that domestication tends to make most animals less
aggressive toward potential predators, some breeds of
domestic chickens are more aggressive than jungle fowl
(Väisänen et al. 2005).
Sensory abilities
Chickens are sensitive to touch, and their skin contains
numerous kinds of receptors for temperature, pressure, and
pain. The beak of the chicken, as in all birds, is a complex
sensory organ with numerous nerve endings. The beak not
only serves to grasp and manipulate food items, but is also
used to manipulate non-food objects in nesting and
exploration, drinking, and preening. It is also used as a
weapon in defensive and aggressive encounters. At the end
of the beak is a specialized cluster of highly sensitive
mechanoreceptors, called the bill tip organ, which allows
chickens to make fine tactile discriminations (Gentle and
Breward 1986). Needless to say, damage to the beak is
intensely painful, as partially debeaked chickens show a
significant increase in guarding behavior, i.e., tucking the
bill under the wing, and diminished use of the bill for
pecking and preening after the procedure. These pain-re-
lated behaviors may continue for months (Duncan et al.
1989; Gentle et al. 1990, 1991).
Chickens, like most birds, depend highly on well-de-
veloped visual abilities which allow them to focus close-up
and far away at the same time in different parts of their
visual field (Dawkins 1995; Dawkins and Woodington
1997), and see a broader range of colors than humans (Ham
and Osorio 2007). Chickens can detect both low- and high-
frequency sound at a variety of pressure levels. Their
adeptness with low-frequency sound may include a
capacity to detect sounds that humans cannot hear (infra-
sound below 20 Hz) (Gleich and Langermann 2011).
Chickens also possess well-developed senses of smell and
taste (Jones and Roper 1997). Finally, like some other
birds, chickens (though not all breeds) possess the ability to
detect and orient to magnetic fields (Freire et al. 2008). All
of these capacities come into play when assessing their
cognitive capacities.
Research methods
This paper presents a summary of cognitive, emotional,
personality, and social characteristics of domestic chick-
ens, built from a comprehensive review of the scientific
literature. I first conducted a search on the Web of Science
Core Collection using terms relevant to intelligence, cog-
nition, and behavior and followed up with online Google-
based direct searches through all of the major peer-
Table 1 List of the major peer-reviewed journals searched
Animal Behaviour
Animal Cognition
Animal Learning and Behavior
Animal Welfare
Anthrozoos




International Journal of Comparative Psychology
Journal of Comparative Psychology
Nature
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews
Physiology and Behavior
Public Library of Science—PloS One and Biology
Science
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reviewed journals (Table 1) using similar terms as well as
key terms from existing papers (e.g., intelligence, cogni-
tion, behavior, learning, memory, sociality, self-awareness,
etc.). I also used more specific search terms in Web of
Science, e.g., time perception, perspective-taking, etc.,
within these broader categories when necessary. Addi-
tionally, I used these terms to search on ScienceDaily for
relevant news items and the peer-reviewed papers they
described. I also conducted a complete search of the Web
sites of the major authors in these fields for all of their
relevant projects. Finally, I searched the reference section
of each paper to find additional papers in additional mis-
cellaneous journals (not listed in Table 1) and ensured that
the overall search was comprehensive. I included books,
book chapters, and dissertation theses, as well as both
empirical and review papers (which provided further
description and interpretation of the empirical data). Both
the basic comparative psychology literature and the applied
literature were included. No time restrictions were placed
on articles for inclusion, but priority was given to more
recent papers when appropriate. The reference section of
the present paper shows the full breadth of the sources
consulted.
Visual cognition and spatial orientation
There is a deep literature on visual cognition and spatial
orientation in chickens (including young chicks) that
demonstrates they are capable of such visual feats as
completion of visual occlusion, biological motion percep-
tion, and object and spatial (even geometric) representa-
tions. One of the cognitive capacities most extensively
explored in this domain is object permanence, that is, the
ability to understand that something exists even when out
of sight. Object permanence unfolds in six developmental
steps beginning, in Stage one, with a lack of understanding
that hidden objects still exist and, in Stage two the ability to
visually track the movement of an object. Stages three and
four are reached when the subject actively retrieves a
partially hidden and fully hidden object, respectively.
Stages five and six are defined as the ability to track the
location of a hidden object after several visible displace-
ments and infer its location after several invisible dis-
placements, respectively (Piaget 1953). Human babies
typically achieve the last stage at about age 2 years (Piaget
1964).
Object permanence has been studied extensively in
many nonhuman animals, who show a range of capacities
within this paradigm. The literature on this phenomenon in
other animals is too extensive to cite here but suffice to say
that many animals, such as great apes, monkeys, cats, dogs,
and birds, demonstrate various levels of sophistication in
object permanence, with many achieving competence in
the final of the six stages (see Gomez 2005, for a review). I
will turn to an examination of object permanence in
chickens in the following sections on partly and completely
occluded objects.
Recognizing partly occluded objects
A number of birds are capable of reaching for partly
occluded objects (amodal completion), the equivalent of
Stage 3 object permanence. To name a few, parrots (Psit-
tacus erithacus), parakeets (Melopsittacus undulates and
Cyanoramphus auriceps), macaws (Ara maracana) (Funk
1996; Pepperberg and Funk 1990), mynahs (Gracula reli-
giosa) (Plowright et al. 1998), magpies (Pica pica) (Pollok
et al. 2000), Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) (Zucca
et al. 2007),and carrion crows (Corvus corone) (Hoffman
et al. 2011) pass these tests (as well as more advanced
stages of object permanence, including, in some, Stage six
competence) easily. Pigeons (Columbia livia), on the other
hand, seem to lose interest in food when it is placed behind
an opaque screen (Plowright et al. 1998).
Most studies of the ability to recognize partly hidden
objects in chickens have employed a paradigm that
involves imprinting just-hatched chicks onto a geometric
shape, such as a red triangle, and testing them later to
determine which of two versions (a partly occluded triangle
or a triangle with a piece missing) they prefer (choose to be
near). Chicks choose the partially occluded triangle (Re-
golin and Vallortigara 1995), just as humans do. The rea-
soning behind this finding is that the chicks, like humans
and some other animals, are ‘‘filling in’’ the occluded part
of the triangle and, therefore, perceiving it as the whole
object upon which they are imprinted. Some studies, using
different stimuli and protocols, have suggested the same
general conclusion for both chicks (Lea et al. 1996) and
adult hens (Forkman 1998). However, it isn’t clear that the
numerous methods used to assess amodal completion in
chicks and in adult hens are similar enough to reveal actual
cognitive similarities between the two age groups (Naka-
mura et al. 2010). Indeed, even humans have difficulty with
amodal completion under certain circumstances that
pigeons and chickens do not (Nakamura et al. 2014). These
findings caution that there is a great deal of heterogeneity
within even one region of cognitive abilities, in this case,
amodal completion, across and within species.
One of the ways the ability to represent partly hidden
objects can be further tested is by determining whether an
animal sees subjective or illusory contours, i.e., parts of a
whole shape only ‘‘suggested’’ by occlusion. A number of
mammalian species perceive subjective contours, e.g., cats
(Bravo et al. 1988) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
(Peterhans and von der Heydt 1989). Birds, e.g., barn owls
130 Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147
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(Tuto alba) (Nieder and Wagner 1999), fish, e.g., redtail
splitfin (Xenotoca eiseni) (Sovrano and Bisazza 2009) and
goldfish (Carrassius auratus) (Wyzisk and Neumeyer
2007) and even invertebrates, e.g., bees (Apis mellifera)
(van Hateren et al. 1990; Nieder 2002, for a review) per-
ceive subjective or illusory contours. Two-week-old chicks
also perceive subjective contours (Zanforlin 1981).
Therefore, these perceptual abilities are rather pervasive,
although not universal, in the animal kingdom. Interesting
questions arise when considering the depth and abstract-
ness of processing of such visual percepts across taxa.
Recognizing completely occluded objects
Tests of Stage 4 object permanence are similar to those of
Stage3 except objects are completelyhidden.Chicks asyoung
as two days old master some, but not all, aspects of Stage 4
object permanence (see Regolin et al. 1994; Vallortigara and
Regolin 2002; see alsoCampbell 1988, for similar evidence in
adult hens). For instance, although chicks do have an object
concept that maintains a representation of the object in the
absence of direct sensory cues, it seems that they are not as
easily able to predict the resting position of an imprinted ball
from its direction of movement prior to occlusion (Freire and
Nicol 1997, 1999). However, chicks are able to choose the
correct screen when the goal-object is a ‘‘social’’ partner (i.e.,
a red ball on which they had been imprinted) (Chiandetti and
Vallortigara 2011). Moreover, chicks also appear to make use
of the directional cue provided by the movement of the prey
when they are tested in the presence of a cage-mate (Regolin
et al. 1995). These studies point to the interesting fact that
chickens, like other social animals, often perform better on
tasks which tap into their social propensities. Consistent with
this idea is the fact that chicks also have a preference for
approaching a point-light stimulus moving in a more biolog-
ically naturalway, i.e., like awalking hen, than the same lights
randomly moving, as they align their bodies in the same
direction of the apparent movement of the ‘‘hen’’ (Regolin
et al. 2000).
In summary, the evidence for Stage 3 object permanence
in chickens is fairly strong but more work needs to be done
to elucidate the mechanisms behind completion of these
tasks in very young chicks versus adult hens. Young chicks
do show some capacities related to Stage 4 object perma-
nence, but these abilities seem to be limited to tasks with
stimuli that resemble natural social situations.
Numerical abilities
In the last few decades, there has been a growing scientific
literature on the numerical competencies of nonhuman
animals. While there is still much debate about what these
abilities mean in nonhuman animals (and even young
human children), they are arguably related to mental rep-
resentation of some kind (Dehaene et al. 1999). At the most
basic level is the ability to discriminate between two or
more sets of objects that are different on the basis of
number of objects in each set, e.g., ‘‘more than…’’ or
‘‘fewer than…’’. Several species show preferences for the
larger amount when deciding between two quantities,
including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (Boysen et al.
2001), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) (Call 2000), rhesus
macaques (Macaca mulatta) (Hauser et al. 2000), bot-
tlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) (Jaakkola et al. 2005;
Kilian et al. 2003), lions (McComb and Packer Cm Pusey
1994), elephants (Elephas maximus) (Irie-Sugimoto et al.
2009), and horses (Equus caballus) (Uller and Lewis
2009), among others.
A more sophisticated capacity closer to a real number
concept is ordinality, the ability to place quantities in a
series. Competence in ordinality is found in several spe-
cies, including many of those above, e.g., chimpanzees
(Boysen and Bernston 1990), rhesus macaques (Brannon
and Terrace 2000), and also pigeons (Brannon et al. 2001),
crows (Smirnova et al. 2000) and African grey parrots
(Pepperberg 1994, 2006).
Experiments with newly hatched domestic chicks (Ru-
gani et al. 2008, 2010; Vallortigara et al. 2010) show that
they are capable of discriminating quantities and a simple
form of ordinality. Chicks were reared with five identical
objects (small balls) on which they imprinted. On days 3 or
4, chicks underwent free-choice tests in which two sets
containing three and two balls disappeared (either simul-
taneously or one by one), each behind one of two opaque
identical screens. Chicks spontaneously inspected the
screen occluding the larger set. In the next experiment,
after the initial disappearance of the two sets, some of the
objects were visibly transferred, one by one, from one
screen to the other. Thus, computation of a series of sub-
sequent additions or subtractions of elements that appeared
and disappeared, one by one, was needed in order to per-
form the task successfully. Chicks chose the screen hiding
the larger number of elements at the end of the event,
irrespective of the directional cues provided by the initial
and final displacements. These experiments also showed
that chicks have a sense of a ‘‘mental number line’’
indicative of ordinality (Rugani et al. 2007).
Rugani et al. (2009) demonstrated that five-day-old
domestic chicks are able to perform arithmetic operations
to a total of five objects (Rugani et al. 2009). When they
were presented with two sets of objects of different quan-
tities disappearing behind two screens, they were able to
successfully track which screen hid the larger number by
apparently performing simple addition and subtraction.
Finally, in a compelling demonstration of shared cognitive
Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147 131
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propensities in chicks and humans, Rugani et al. (2015)
showed that chicks always associate the smaller of two
quantities with the left, rather than right, spatial location.
The authors suggest that, due to similar neural architecture,
the chicks, like many other species, have a shared predis-
position to map numbers onto geometrical space in a
similar way.
It is clear that chickens, as a species, share a number of
sophisticated cognitive capacities with other animals.
However, because these studies depend heavily upon
imprinting paradigms they are weighted toward studies
with very young animals. These early-emerging core
abilities do not exclude learning, particularly in a social
context, as an important driver of chicken cognition any
more than it does in humans with similar precocial
capacities. But there is a paucity of information about how
these abilities play out developmentally into adulthood in
chickens, and more information is urgently needed about
this process to gain better insight into what these capacities
mean for cognitive complexity in a comparative context.
Time perception/anticipation of future events
An area of longstanding interest in comparative cognition
is time perception, i.e., the ability to detect the passage of
time. In general, time perception has to do with the ques-
tion of whether other animals live entirely in the present or
can anticipate a future.
Basic time perception is considered by many scientists
to be requisite for the more sophisticated process of mental
time travel—the conscious ability to mentally represent the
past and plan for the future. The ability to travel backwards
in time and recollect specific past events is called episodic
memory. It has been argued that episodic memory is tied to
mental time travel (Dere et al. 2006). Arguably, therefore,
when coupled with an episodic memory system, time
perception becomes evidence for an autobiographical sense
of self in the past, present, and future.
Perception of time intervals
Many animals have a sense of time duration, which helps
them to know the time of day and predict when events will
occur (Gallistel 1994; Richelle and Lejeune 1980).
Domestic pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus) for instance, show a
capacity for temporal response differentiation (Ferguson
et al. 2009) and distinguishing between short versus long
time intervals (Spinka et al. 1998). Furthermore, they are
able to anticipate future negative or positive events (Im-
feld-Mueller et al. 2011).
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and other great apes
show sophisticated abilities in the time perception realm, as
they are able to prepare themselves for future actions (e.g.,
tool use: Beran et al. 2004; Osvath and Osvath 2008) even
as much as 14 h in advance (Mulcahy and Call 2006). They
also demonstrate a capacity for episodic memory. They can
remember highly specific contextual elements; that is, the
what, where, and when of events when an hour or even two
weeks have passed (Martin-Ordas et al. 2010, 2013). Bot-
tlenose dolphins also show robust evidence of episodic
memory in complex tasks requiring them to directly access
memories of behaviors they have performed previously
(Mercado et al. 1998).
At the simplest level, studies of time perception in birds
have shown that a number of avian species, e.g., pigeons
(Roberts et al. 1989) and black-capped chickadees (Parus
atricapillus) (Brodbeck et al. 1998), are able to estimate
short time intervals of up to 60 s. This has been demonstrated
using operant conditioning techniques inwhich the pattern of
peck responses indicates the bird’s ability to anticipate an
upcoming food reward. However, these and other bird spe-
cies have shown temporal abilities that go beyond these
findings when given the opportunity. For instance, one study
with pigeons showed they were capable of judging intervals
of up to 8 min (Zeiler and Powell 1994). Western scrub jays
(Aphelocoma californica) make provisions in advance for a
future need, both by preferentially caching food in a place
where they have learned that they will be hungry the next
morning, and by differentially storing particular food items
in a place in which that type of food will not be available the
next morning (Raby et al. 2007).
In the only study directly testing time perception in
chickens, five thirty-week old hens were able to predict,
approximately, a 6-min interval when given a reliable
predictive visual signal (Taylor et al. 2002). The hens were
required to peck a computer-controlled touch screen that
delivered a food reward upon the first peck after 6 min.
The hens showed they were capable of estimating the time
interval by showing a pattern of increased pecking fre-
quency around the 6-min mark. As good as the chicken’s
performance was, it should be noted that they were able to
achieve this performance within a highly artificial setting.
Almost certainly, a more naturalistic setting would allow
the chickens’ temporal abilities to be more easily demon-
strated, as all animals, including birds, depend upon the
appropriate environmental context for the full expression
of their behavior.
In another study which tapped into time perception
through an anticipatory emotional response, laying hens
were taught to discriminate three sounds which signaled
either a positive outcome (food reward), a negative out-
come (a squirt from a water gun) or a neutral outcome
(nothing) after a 15-s delay. The hens showed differential
emotional responses to the different sounds suggesting that
they were able to anticipate a future outcome (Zimmerman
132 Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147
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et al. 2011). More details about the birds’ emotional
responses can be found in the section on Emotions below.
Episodic memory
Studies of episodic memory provide a window into the
question of whether other animals remember personal
experiences, i.e., possess episodic memory. Episodic
memory, a component of declarative memory, is tied to
whether an individual experiences life autobiographically
(autonoetic consciousness). Tulving (2005) defined episo-
dic memory in terms of its subjective experience. More-
over, the demonstration of episodic memory in other
animals has been argued to be probative of autonoetic
conscious experience, as it relies upon distinctive personal
memories (Dere et al. 2006; Eichenbaum et al. 2005;
Martin-Ordas et al. 2013).
In addition to many mammals, including great apes
(Martin-Ordas et al. 2013; Schwartz et al. 2005), a number
of bird species demonstrate evidence for memory described
as ‘‘episodic-like’’ (Clayton and Dickinson 1998). In a
visual discrimination task which allowed for control over
confounding variables, Zentall et al. (2001) found some
evidence for episodic memory in White Carneaux pigeons.
In this study, the pigeons were essentially asked the
question: ‘‘Did you just peck or not?’’ and they remem-
bered specific details which allowed them to ‘‘answer’’ this
question with key pecks. In other studies, pigeons have
demonstrated meta-knowledge about the behavior they just
emitted, that is, knowledge about their own knowledge
(Shimp 1982).
But in other studies, the evidence for metacognition is
inconclusive (Iwasaki et al. 2013). Western scrub jays
(Aphelocoma coerulescens) show evidence of episodic
memory, i.e., the what, where, and when of food-caching
episodes. Jays can remember when and where they cached
a variety of foods that differ in the rate at which they decay,
and retrieve those stored foods later in the appropriate
order. They can update their memory of the contents of a
cache depending upon whether they have previously vis-
ited the site. Furthermore, they can also remember where
other birds cache their food, showing that they encode rich
mental representations of caching events (Clayton et al.
2001, for a comprehensive review of these studies).
Although there has been some debate about whether these
findings represent episodic memory or other forms of
associative learning (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007),
these criticisms have been disputed (Raby et al. 2007).
Clearly, some very interesting complex cognitive processes
are coming into play in these food-caching behaviors.
In a more direct test of metacognition in scrub jays, the
birds were required to allocate a proportion of time looking
into two peepholes in order to see food being hidden in
either of two compartments, one where observing the
hiding location was necessary to later relocate the food,
and another where food could easily be found without
watching. The jays first separately experienced the conse-
quences of possessing information in each compartment
and subsequently, once given a choice, made more looks
and spent more time looking into the compartment where
information was necessary than into the compartment
where it was unnecessary. Thus, the jays showed that they
not only can differentiate sources of information according
to their potential value but they can collect information
needed to solve a future problem (Watanabe et al. 2013).
As mentioned above, the presence of episodic memory
in chickens might be inferred from findings like the ones
described above on time perception and anticipation, which
probe capacities that are correlated with episodic memory.
But there are other ways to more directly investigate the
presence of episodic memory in chickens. Studies of
memory using a matching-to-sample paradigm may reveal
episodic-like memory components because they require the
subject to ‘‘declare’’ the characteristics of a stimulus they
have kept in memory. Hens can successfully complete
these tasks, but the delays used are typically very short (on
the order of seconds, see Foster et al. 1995). In studies of
Stage 4 object permanence like those described above,
episodic memory can be tested by imposing a delayed
response procedure that requires maintaining a memory of
a specific event over a longer period of time than just a few
seconds. Chickens are able to remember the trajectory of a
hidden ball for up to 180 s if they could see the ball moving
and up to 1 min if the displacement of the ball was invis-
ible to them (Vallortigara et al. 1998). In other words, they
did as well as most primates (Wu et al. 1986) under similar
conditions.
In other studies, five-day-old chicks were fed with two
plates, each with a different kind of food. The food was
devalued by pre-feeding with one of the food types, thus
decreasing the novelty and incentive for that food type
compared with the other. When tested later (on the order of
a few minutes), the checks went to the location where they
had previously found food (Cozzutti and Vallortigara,
2001). Similar results have been found for hens (Forkman
2000) showing that chicks and adult chickens are capable
of remembering the ‘‘where’’ and ‘‘what’’ components of
information about food.
Self-control
Self-control can be broadly defined as the ability to resist
immediate gratification for a later benefit. It may be asso-
ciated with planning for the future because foreplanning
requires not only mental time travel, but the ability to
inhibit or delay a response until later. However, the
Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147 133
123
relationship between self-control and planning for the
future is still in need of clarification in many studies.
Self-control may also be associated with the develop-
ment of self-awareness (Genty et al. 2004) and auton-
omy—the ability to think about and choose future
outcomes. Self-control is typically not reliably demon-
strated in human children until they are at least 4 years of
age (Mischel et al. 1989). Self-control is generally assessed
in humans and other animals by determining whether they
can delay obtaining a small reward for a larger reward
later. Thus, these tests are prospective timing tasks
requiring prediction of an outcome in the future based on
experience in the past. Many mammals show self-control
under these circumstances, including rats (Rattus norvegi-
cus) (e.g., Chelonis et al. 1998; Flaherty and Checke 1982),
and primates, such as lemurs (Eulemur fulvus and E.
macaco) (Genty et al. 2004), rhesus monkeys (Macaca
mulatta) (Beran et al. 2004), chimpanzees and orangutans
(Pongo pygmaeus) (Beran 2002; Osvath and Osvath 2008).
A number of avian species demonstrate self-control in
experimental situations, including pigeons (e.g., Logue
et al. 1985; Mazur 2000), black-capped chickadees (Feeney
et al. 2009, 2011), and, in a similar paradigm to that used
with primates, the carrion crow (Corvus corone) and the
common raven (Corvus corax) (Dufour et al. 2011).
Domestic chickens, too, show the capacity for self-
control in an experimental setting. In a situation where they
are given a choice between a 2-s delay followed by access
to food for 3 s or a 6-s delay followed by access for 22 s (a
veritable jackpot), hens held out for the larger reward,
demonstrating rational discrimination between different
future outcomes while employing self-control to optimize
those outcomes (Abeyesinghe et al. 2005). Given the
promising results of this study, more exploration of the
cognitive basis of self-control in chickens is indicated.
Reasoning and logical inference
The ability to reason and apply logic is a hallmark of
intelligence in humans and nonhumans alike. Perhaps the
kind of logical reasoning most explored in animals other
than humans is a form of syllogism called transitive
inference. Transitive inference is a type of deductive rea-
soning that allows one to derive a relation between items
that have not been explicitly compared before. In a general
form, it is the ability to deduce that if Item B is larger than
Item C and Item C is larger than Item D, then Item B must
be larger than Item D (Lazareva 2012). This form of
inference has been described as a cognitive developmental
milestone unique to humans who are at least 7 years of age
and in the concrete operational stage of development (Pi-
aget 1928).
However, there is now evidence for transitive inference
in a wide range of nonhuman animals, including chim-
panzees, various species of monkeys, rats, and several
avian species (see Vasconcelos 2008, for a review of this
literature). Chickens have also demonstrated this capacity
(Hogue et al. 1996). When hens are placed together for the
first time, they set up a dominance hierarchy—a pecking
order. Dominant hens defeat subordinates by pecking at
them, jumping on them, or clawing them. Subordinates
show submission by crouching or trying to get away. In this
study, hens were placed with others in dyads and triads to
determine how hens use information about the relation-
ships among others to assess their own position in the
pecking order when confronting a new individual. In one
condition, hens witnessed a familiar dominant individual
being defeated by a stranger and then they were introduced
to the stranger. In another condition, the hens observed a
familiar dominant hen defeat a stranger. In a third condi-
tion, the subjects witnessed two strangers establishing a
dominance relationship before being introduced to their
prior dominant and to a stranger the former had just
defeated.
Subjects in the first condition, after seeing a known
dominant individual being defeated by the stranger, did
not challenge the stranger when confronted. Their
actions indicated they understood that if this stranger can
defeat someone who can defeat them, then they are not
going to defeat that stranger. In the second condition, the
hens attacked the stranger half of the time, indicating
that they understood they had some chance of defeating
her. In the third condition, the proportion of times the
hens first approached the stranger matched whether they
saw the stranger being defeated by the dominant hen or
not. These results, altogether, indicate that hens can gain
useful information about their status in the dominance
hierarchy before actually engaging another hen by
observing how that hen interacts with a ‘‘known entity’’
(the prior dominant hen). The results of this study are
consistent with the idea that the hens were making self-
assessments based upon the logic of transitive inference.
They also show that, while simple processes can some-
times be the basis of complex-looking behavioral phe-
nomena, sophisticated logical reasoning may underlie
what is perceived to be a rather simple behavior—the
pecking order.
There is still some discussion in the literature about the
fundamental nature of transitive inference in nonhuman
animals (Vasconcelos 2008). Nevertheless, social animals,
including chickens, seem capable of employing some level
of logical reasoning in important adaptive domains. As
discussed below, this ability supports the emergence of
complex social relationships in many nonhuman animals.
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Self-awareness
Self-awareness is subjective awareness of one’s identity,
one’s body, and one’s thoughts through time, distinguished
from others. In other words: a sense of ‘‘I.’’ The question of
self-awareness in other animals appears to be on the extreme
cutting edge of our ability to assess who they are to them-
selves. Self-awareness has been associated with a variety of
related concepts, including phenomenal consciousness, self-
consciousness, metacognition, and autonoetic conscious-
ness. All of these terms converge upon the fundamental
capacity to be aware of one’s independent existence in the
physical and/or psychological domain. Importantly, the
concept of self-awareness is likely to be multidimensional
and, given the developmental evidence, best thought of as a
continuum of awareness (Marino 2010). There are two
studies that bear on the question of self-awareness in
chickens: self-control and self-assessment.
Self-control
As discussed above, chickens show self-control in experi-
mental situations (Abeyesinghe et al. 2005) which require
them to forgo an immediate reward for a later larger reward.
Some authors have argued that self-control is indicative of
self-awareness (Genty et al. 2004), as it tends to emerge
reliably in humans at around the age of four, when other
cognitive capacities related to self-awareness (e.g., mirror
self-recognition) have either developed or are developing
(Mischel et al. 1989). Although self-control is not direct evi-
dence of all forms of self-awareness, it may be an important
indicator of a sense of self at some level (but see Ainslie 1974;
Rachlin andGreen 1972, for other interpretations). It has been
hypothesized that self-control depends upon the presence of
episodic memory, and implying some capacity to mentally
work through different scenarios for the future and choose the
one providing the best option (e.g., the biggest reward) (Boyer
2008; Osvath and Osvath 2008). Thus, the presence of self-
control over time in chickens may indicate a cognitive
capacity on a continuum of complexity with foreplanning and
mental time travel.
Moreover, self-control may be related to self-agency,
the subjective awareness that one is initiating, executing,
and controlling one’s own volitional action in the world
(Kaneko and Tomonaga 2011). However, no direct tests of
self-agency in chickens have been conducted, and this
concept remains essentially unexplored, making it an
excellent option for further study.
Self-assessment
Another component of a sense of self is the ability to
compare oneself to others as a distinct entity. Among birds,
Greylag geese and pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanoce-
phalus) can infer their own social status by observing
unfamiliar individuals interacting with familiar birds (Weiß
et al. 2010; Paz-y-Mino et al. 2004) Chickens can apply
logical inference to social situations as well. As Hogue
et al. (1996) showed in their study of transitive inference,
chickens can observe the interactions of an individual of
known status with an unknown individual and infer their
own status in the social hierarchy relative to the unknown
individual and respond appropriately (e.g., dominantly or
submissively) in future interactions. These studies show
that in socially complex birds, such as chickens, logical
inference is likely important for navigating their social
landscape.
Communication
Communication involves the transfer of information from
one individual to another—a critical component of social
complexity. The study of communication in animals
involves characterizing its functionality, contexts, uses,
structure, and complexity. There is still considerable debate
in the animal communication literature about the nature of
communication in other animals, including how it com-
pares with human languages. Many theorists still have
reservations about the depth and complexity of animal
communication systems. These reservations are often
based in the assumption that human language is entirely
unique. Animal ‘‘signals,’’ in comparison, are said to be
involuntary products of emotional states, lacking in inten-
tionality, richness, and flexibility, without connection to
cognition and thinking (e.g., Berwick et al. 2013; Lieber-
man 1994; Luria 1982; Premack 1975). Although just like
humans, animals do sometimes communicate in nonlin-
guistic, involuntary affective displays; some animal com-
munication is clearly cognitively complex, reflecting
flexible mental representations. In fact, there is an abun-
dance of evidence for complex, flexible, and rule-governed
natural communication systems across a wide array of
species (Slobodchikoff 2012).
Chicken communication consists of a large repertoire of
at least 24 distinct vocalizations, as well as different visual
displays (Collias 1987; Collias and Joos 1953). But the
sophistication of chicken communication comes to the
forefront when one examines how these vocalizations are
used and the cognitive capacities they apparently rely
upon.
Referential communication
Referential communication involves signals (calls, dis-
plays, whistles, etc.) which convey information, i.e., refer
Anim Cogn (2017) 20:127–147 135
123
to specific elements of the environment. What makes ref-
erential communication so interesting and complex is that
it implies that the animals using it attach meaning to each
signal in a way not unlike the way humans use words for
objects and other entities in our world. In other words,
referential communication has semanticity. It is generally
studied by observing and recording a signal’s usage and
then using playback recordings in an experimental
manipulation to determine the actual meaning and use of
the signal to the receivers. If a very tight correlation
between the specific eliciting event and the receivers’
responses is found, the signals can be said to be referential,
i.e., function to convey information about the content or
nature of the event and, often, the appropriate response.
Referential communication stands in contrast to long-
held assumptions that animal signals are only reflexive
‘‘stimulus-bound’’ responses, or contain only very low
level information about affective state (e.g., aggression) or
physical attributes of the caller (e.g., size). Referential
communication shows that there are important cognitive
components to animal communication requiring inten-
tionality and mental representation. That is, referential
communication serves to evoke mental representations of
the eliciting event in the minds of the receivers (Evans
1997, 2002; Evans and Evans 2007).
Functionally referential communication has been iden-
tified in many mammal and bird species. Vervet monkeys
were the first species found to have referential communi-
cation. They have acoustically distinct alarm calls corre-
sponding to three different types of predators, each of
which requires a different type of response on the part of
the receivers (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Seyfarth et al.
1980; Struhsaker 1967). Referential communication is also
found in ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta) (Macedonia
1990), chimpanzees (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 2005),
Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus diana) (Zuberbühler 2000),
bottlenose dolphins (Janik et al. 2006), black-tailed prairie
dogs (Cynomys ludovicianus) (Frederiksen and Slobod-
chikoff 2007), and domestic dogs (Gaunet and Deputte,
2011; Miklósi et al. 2000; Polari et al. 2000) to name a few
mammal species. Several species of birds also engage in
referential communication, including ravens (Bugnyar
et al. 2001) and chickadees (Templeton et al. 2005), among
others.
Chickens, too, demonstrate considerable complexity in
their use of referential communication. When shown com-
puter-generated animations of natural predators, roosters
emit distinctive alarm calls. For example, when shown aerial
predators (e.g., a raptor flying overhead), they give one alarm
call, and when shown a terrestrial predator (e.g., raccoon),
they give another distinct alarm call (Evans et al. 1993a, b).
The strongest alarm calls aremadewhen a large, fast-moving
hawk appears overhead (Evans et al. 1993a, b). The
differential responses show specificity in their alarm calls.
Likewise, receivers of these calls react to them in specific and
appropriate ways, showing that the calls have the same
meaning for all of the individuals in the group.
To add to the complexity of this behavior, males often
employ risk compensation tactics which shape their com-
municative behavior when a predator appears (Kokolakis
et al. 2010). For instance, a male is more likely to make an
aerial alarm call when a female is present, which increases
the chances of his mate and offspring surviving (Wilson
and Evans 2008). There is considerable flexibility—and
strategy—in alarm calling as well. By varying the com-
position and duration of the call, the male can still alert his
social group while also confusing the predator about his
exact location (Wood et al. 2000; Bayly and Evans 2003).
For instance, a male will more likely sound an alarm if a
subordinate is nearby, thereby giving the predator more
than one target to hone in on (Kokolakis et al. 2010).
Moreover, males give longer duration alarm calls (which
are easier for prey to locate than shorter ones) when under
cover of a tree or bush, suggesting that the rooster may
have some understanding of the visual perspective of the
aerial predator (see Perspective-taking and social manipu-
lation below). These and other studies show that chickens
are sensitive to ‘‘audience effects,’’ that is, their commu-
nication behavior is mediated by who is available to
receive the call. For instance, males call far more often
when a familiar conspecific is present than if he is alone or
with a member of another species (Karakashian et al.
1988). Taken together, audience effects are consistent with
the suggestion that communication in chickens is volitional
and shaped by cognition and social awareness. However,
much more research is needed to clarify the cognitive basis
for the behaviors described above.
In addition to alarm calls, males also make food calls
when they find a delectable tidbit. They combine these
calls with rhythmic movements involving picking up and
dropping the food morsel repeatedly—a signal called the
tidbitting display. This referential display is loud and
individually distinctive, broadcasting the identity of the
caller to the whole group. This display is enmeshed in the
complex social relationships among individuals in each
group, as hens use it to determine which males will provide
food and, thus, with whom they want to mate (Evans and
Evans 1999; Pizzari 2003). Moreover, the vigor of the
display is correlated with the quality of the food and the
chances that a female will approach (Marler et al. 1986).
The years of experimental work on chicken communi-
cation show that it is vastly more complex than originally
thought, suggesting the existence of cognitive awareness,
flexibility, and even more sophisticated capacities such as
perspective-taking and intentional or tactical deception (see
the section below). As with other areas, chickens’
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communication skills provide evidence for similarity with
other highly intelligent complex social species, including
primates.
Social cognition and complexity
Social cognition is the use of cognitive skills (learning,
memory, reasoning, problem solving, decision making,
etc.) within the social domain, forming the basis for cog-
nitive complexity and intelligence across a wide range of
species. For many highly social animals, complex cogni-
tive capacities are most clearly demonstrated when applied
in a social setting, suggesting that many of these abilities
evolved as adaptations to social living (Evans 2002). There
is an abundance of empirical evidence showing a positive
correlation between various high-level cognitive capacities
and measures of social complexity in species as wide-
ranging as domestic pigs (Marino and Colvin 2015, for a
review), dogs (Bensky et al. 2013, for a review), primates
(e.g., Dunbar 1998), dolphins and whales (Whitehead and
Rendell 2015), and birds (Burish et al. 2004). These social
cognitive capacities are important indicators of a flexible
and dynamic intelligence and are intertwined with other
dimensions of psychology, such as emotional responding
and personality.
Chickens, like many other animals, demonstrate their
cognitive complexity when placed in social situations
requiring them to solve problems. Furthermore, chickens
show even greater psychological complexity by flexibly,
and often strategically, navigating a dynamic network of
social relationships.
Discriminating among individuals
The ability to discriminate among individuals forms the
basis for social relationships, hierarchies, and reactions to
familiar versus unfamiliar individuals. Individual discrim-
ination is a prerequisite to the more complex capacity of
true individual recognition, defined as a mental represen-
tation of an individual’s identifying characteristics. Thus,
individual discrimination is a logical beginning for inves-
tigating a species’ general social recognition abilities.
The range of social species that can discriminate indi-
viduals in their social group is wide. Among mammals,
dogs (Molnar et al. 2009), pigs (de Souza et al. 2006;
McLeman et al. 2005), elephants (McComb et al. 2000),
vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1980), dolphins (Sayigh et al. 1999), macaques
(Macaca mulatta) (Parr et al. 2000), chimpanzees (Parr
et al. 2000), and numerous others have been shown to have
this ability. The literature on vocal recognition in songbirds
is well known and voluminous.
Visual recognition of conspecifics has also been
demonstrated by birds, e.g., rooks, Corvus frugilegus (Bird
and Emery 2008), pigeons (Nakamura et al. 2003), white-
throated sparrows, Zonotrichia albicollis (Whitfield 1987),
and budgerigars, Melopsittacus undulatus (Brown and
Dooling 1992), to name a few. Some birds can also dis-
criminate conspecifics on the basis of odor, e.g., Antarctic
prions (Pachyptila desolata) (Bonadonna et al. 2007).
Chickens, too, show notable abilities to recognize indi-
viduals in their social group, as well as the ability to keep
track of the group’s social hierarchy and the individuals
within it (as discussed previously). Not only do chickens
recognize who is and is not a member of their social group,
but they differentiate individuals within their own group.
Under various experimental conditions, domestic chickens
have demonstrated the capacity to visually discriminate
and recognize a large number of conspecifics presented live
(Bradshaw 1991, 1992; D’Eath and Stone 1999) and in
color slides (Bradshaw and Dawkins 1993; Ryan and Lea
1994).
Perspective-taking and social manipulation
The ability to take the perspective of another individual is a
complex cognitive capacity that allows an individual not
only to respond to conspecifics, but also manipulate them.
The most basic form of visual perspective-taking requires
taking a viewpoint other than one’s own, sometimes using
that information to one’s advantage. This capacity is often
referred to as Machiavellian Intelligence (Whiten and
Byrne 1997), defined as a kind of sociopolitical maneu-
vering involving deceit and manipulation of others’ mental
states. It is considered a driver of the evolution of intelli-
gence in primates, including humans (Humphrey 1976;
Whiten and Byrne 1997). Perspective-taking has been
associated with a number of other cognitive capacities,
including self-awareness, theory of mind, intentional
deception, and empathy in primates (Bulloch et al. 2008; de
Waal 2008; Towner 2010, for a comprehensive review of
these issues). A number of highly intelligent species have
demonstrated well-developed capacities in the realm of
conspecific perspective-taking, including chimpanzees
(Krachun and Call 2009), dogs (Bräuer et al. 2013), pigs
(Held et al. 2000, 2002) and, in the avian domain, Western
scrub jays (Clayton et al. 2007). Here, too, domestic
chickens show compelling abilities.
Returning to the tidbitting display, because the vocal
and behavioral components of the display are redundant, a
receiver of either one of the components will get the
message indicating the presence of food. This dual-com-
ponent nature of the tidbitting display is used by subordi-
nate males to their advantage. Dominant males who hear
subordinate males giving the tidbitting display will often
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attack and then displace the subordinate male. To minimize
this occurrence, subordinates tend to omit the more con-
spicuous vocal components and restrict themselves to the
movements of the visual display. However, when dominant
males are distracted by something else, the subordinate
adds back in the vocal component, which serves to attract
females who are eavesdropping. This behavior suggests
that the subordinate male is taking the perspective of the
dominant male and using information about his attentional
state to personal advantage (Smith et al. 2011).
Deception is another example of possible Machiavellian
Intelligence in chickens. Males will sometimes make a
food call in the absence of any food. This serves to attract
females who, once near them, can be engaged and defen-
ded against other males (Gyger and Marler 1988). Of
course, females develop counter-strategies and eventually
stop responding to males who call too often in the absence
of food (Evans 2002). These kinds of social strategies—
deception and counter-strategies—are striking similar to
the same kinds of complex behaviors identified in mam-
mals, including primates.
Social learning
One of the ways that social species take advantage of group
living is through social (observational) learning—observ-
ing conspecifics’ behavior and its consequences in order to
avoid time-consuming and sometimes hazardous ‘‘trial and
error’’ learning. Social learning appears to be a form of
deferred imitation (action learning) or emulation (results
learning), serving as a mechanism for the transmission of
learned behaviors over stretches of time, i.e., culture. But
imitation and emulation are only two of a number of
potential mechanisms for social learning (Zentall 2012),
and careful experimentation is needed to differentiate
among the many cognitive bases for social learning in other
animals.
Many animals engage in social learning, including
chimpanzees (e.g., Yamamoto et al. 2013), capuchin
monkeys (Cebus apella) (Ottoni and Mannu 2001), and
birds, such as ravens (Bugnyar and Kotrschal 2002) and
quail (Koksal and Domjan 1998), to name a few. Chickens,
too, engage in social learning to avoid the costs of direct
learning (Nicol 2006). The use of syllogistic logic in
determining the status of self and other in the social hier-
archy is a strong example of observational learning in
chickens (Hogue et al. 1996). Moreover, naı̈ve hens who
watched a trained hen perform a task were able to perform
that task correctly more often than those who watched
another naı̈ve hen (Nicol and Pope 1992, 1994). Among
conspecifics, the identity and social status of the demon-
strator is important, as chickens learn from dominant
individuals more readily than subordinates (Nicol and Pope
1999). Moreover, this effect is not based upon the fact that
dominant individuals perform the task better than subor-
dinates (Nicol and Pope 1999). Rather, it seems to be based
upon the fact that more attention is paid to dominant
individuals than others in the group. Therefore, in chickens,
as in other animals, social factors mediate learning factors
in a complex way.
Emotion
Emotions are comprised of behavioral, neurophysiological,
cognitive, and conscious subjective processes (Mendl and
Paul 2004; Paul et al. 2005). Cognition can modulate
emotional responses and visa versa (Mendl et al. 2009;
Paul et al. 2005). Many studies of emotions in other ani-
mals, including chickens, refer instead to ‘‘affective state’’
or ‘‘core affect’’ (Fraser et al. 1997). ‘‘Affect’’ typically is
discussed as either a pleasurable or displeasurable state
(otherwise known as valence), coupled with some degree
of intensity or arousal (Barrett 2006). The relationship
between affect and emotion is complex, containing a
number of components still widely debated on a theoretical
level (Barrett 2012). Emotions are considered more cog-
nitively based than affect, but are shaped by affect. It may
be argued that some authors use the term ‘‘affect’’ instead
of ‘‘emotion’’ to be conservative about claiming other
animals have complex psychological states. Nevertheless,
there is a large body of literature demonstrating complex
emotions in other animals, including chickens.
For a long time, the study of emotions in other animals,
including chickens, was focused exclusively on negative
emotions. But it is now widely accepted that other animals
experience genuine positive emotions, not simply the
absence of negative emotions (Balcombe 2007; Boissy
et al. 2007). This realization is important for two reasons.
First, it is critical to welfare efforts on behalf of other
animals (Boissy et al. 2007). Second, it brings to light the
richness and shared psychology between humans and other
animals (Balcombe 2007).
Emotions are ubiquitous in birds, as elsewhere in the
animal kingdom (Bekoff 2005; Panksepp 2004). For
instance, studies of emotional reactions to conspecific
songs in white-throated sparrows (Zonotrichia albicollis)
(Earp and Maney 2012), mood shifts in European starlings
(Sturnus vulgaris) (Bateson and Matheson 2007), and fear
responses in quail (Coturnix coturnix), (Mills and Faure
1986) provide evidence of both negative and positive avian
emotions.
A review of the literature makes it clear that much more
information is needed to understand chicken (and other
bird) emotions. There are, however, a number of com-
pelling findings implying that not only chickens experience
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emotions but that those emotions can be quite complex,
given that they are combined with cognition and sociality.
Fear responses
A host of studies provides convincing evidence of fear in
chickens under a range of circumstances, including capture
and restraint, open fields, and novelty. Chickens respond
with a variety of complex behaviors adapted to each of the
circumstances, e.g., tonic immobility upon restraint, and
avoidance in some cases of the appearance of novel objects
(Forkman et al. 2007, for a review of this literature).
Emotional responses in chickens are accompanied by
physiological reactions, i.e., tachycardia and bodily fever
(also known as ‘‘emotional fever’’), which underscore the
shared characteristics of these emotions in chickens with
other animals and humans (Cabanac and Aizawa 2000).
Emotional response during anticipation
As discussed previously, one study of chickens tapped into
time perception through an anticipatory emotional
response. Laying hens were taught to discriminate three
sounds which signaled either a positive (food reward),
negative (a squirt from a water gun) or neutral (just wait-
ing) outcome after a 15-s delay. The hens showed a range
of emotional responses apparently in anticipation of the
different future outcomes. For instance, in anticipation of
the negative event, the birds showed more head movements
and locomotion than in anticipation of both the neutral and
positive event. The increased locomotion or stepping was
consistent with pacing behavior, which is correlated with
anxiety over an impending aversive encounter. In antici-
pation of the positive event, there was no increased step-
ping. Rather, the birds showed comfort behaviors (e.g.,
preening, wing flapping, feather ruffling, body scratching)
consistent with relaxation (Zimmerman et al. 2011).
Emotions and decision making
It is now well understood that humans and other animals
make complex decisions based on emotions more than on
facts, computations, or analyses (Bechara and Damasio
2005; Stephens 2008). In the case of many animals, com-
plex foraging decisions appear to be made based upon
emotional responses to various factors in the environment.
The relationship between an emotional response to an
environment and the decision to avoid or approach that
environment, are key elements of animal welfare (Barnard
2007). Not surprisingly, chickens consistently choose to be
in environments which offer better welfare as measured by
several physiological welfare indicators (Nicol et al. 2009;
Nicol et al. 2011a, b). In an investigation of the relationship
between emotional response to three different environ-
ments and foraging decisions with risk trade-offs, Nicol
et al. (2011a, b) found that laying hens had lower corti-
costerone levels (a physiological measure of stress) when
making a positive environmental choice. Higher head
temperature (another physiological marker of arousal) was
also associated with preferred environments. Overall, the
authors concluded: ‘‘Finding a link between a subset of
physiological stress responses and decision making in a
foraging context leaves open the possibility that birds may
make use of emotional state variables as a proximate
method of choosing between complex environments.’’ (p.
262).
Emotions and cognitive bias
Cognitive bias is a deviation in judgment as a result of
emotion-inducing experiences. It is tested (in humans and
other animals) by exposing an individual to a positive or
negative experience, and determining how those experi-
ences shape perceptions of neutral or ambiguous stimuli
(Mendl and Paul 2004). Depressed and anxious humans
tend to interpret ambiguous situations more pessimistically
than others (Mathews et al. 1995). Many nonhuman ani-
mals, including rats, dogs, primates, and starlings, show
evidence of emotion-induced cognitive biases (Mendl et al.
2009, for a review of this literature). For instance, Bateson
and Matheson (2007) found that European starlings who
had recently been deprived of environmental enrichment in
their home pens, flipped open the lids of food pots of an
ambiguous color less often than did control birds. These
results provide evidence that the birds’ negative mood was
the basis for responding more pessimistically to ambiguous
cues than individuals in a relatively more positive mood.
Wichman et al. (2012) examined the evidence for cog-
nitive bias in hens housed in either basic or enriched pens.
When they measured emotional responses and various
measures of performance on a cognitive task, they found no
differences in emotional state across the two treatments.
Instead, differences between individuals were stronger than
group differences. Individual factors such as fear level,
relationship to their conspecifics, and motivation to feed
were correlated with the birds’ behavior in the anticipation
and cognitive bias tests. These results do not provide evi-
dence of cognitive bias in chickens, but hint at the possi-
bility that different manipulations, i.e., those that are
stronger than individual differences, may reveal an effect.
Emotional contagion and empathy
Emotions are often thought to be related to empathy.
Empathy has been defined as having a similar emotional
state to another as a result of the accurate perception of the
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other’s situation or predicament (Hatfield et al. 1993;
Preston and de Waal 2002). Thus, there is both a cognitive
and an emotional component to empathy. Emotions tend to
influence more than one individual in a group, as they can
be shared in a process known as emotional contagion. And,
therefore, emotional contagion, an emotional response
resulting in a similar emotion being aroused in an observer
as a direct result of perceiving the same emotion in another,
has been considered a simple form of empathy (De Waal
2003, 2008; Preston and De Waal 2002; Singer 2006). De
Waal (2008) suggests that emotional contagion forms the
basis of sympathetic concern (which involves some per-
spective-taking), and these lead to empathy-based altruism.
Emotional contagion, like other proximate psychologi-
cal mechanisms, serves the ultimate purpose of providing a
way for social animals to take in social cues about
important circumstances and respond accordingly. Thus,
emotional contagion has been demonstrated in many
socially complex species such as dogs (Canis lupus
familiaris) (Joly-Mascheroni et al. 2008), wolves (Canis
lupus) (Romero et al. 2014), great apes (Anderson et al.
2004; Palagi et al. 2014), and pigs (Reimert et al. 2014).
Although birds have not been traditional subjects in this
area, recent work suggests a more sophisticated capacity
for emotional response to conspecifics than previously
realized, e.g., in ravens (Corvus corax) (Fraser and Bugn-
yar 2010) and geese (Anser anser) (Wascher et al. 2008).
In a study of how hens respond to their chicks’ distress,
Edgar et al. (2011) found strong evidence for not only
emotional contagion but also of empathy. Thirty-two hens
experienced three conditions: a mildly aversive air puff
into their cage (in order to provide experience with the
aversive characteristics of an air puff), observation of an air
puff into the cage where their chicks resided, or a control
consisting of an air puff aimed outside of either cage. The
hens were outfitted with heart rate monitors and were also
monitored for eye and comb temperature with a thermal
imaging camera. Hen behavior, vocalizations, and chick
vocalizations were monitored continuously.
Importantly, the hens did not show any significant
physiological or behavioral response to air puffs in their
own cage. However, when they observed their chicks
receiving the air puffs, there was a demonstrable response
on the part of the mother hens, with physiological and
behavioral changes indicating emotional distress. Their
responses included increased heart rate and lower eye and
comb temperatures (indicating vasoconstriction and
increased body core temperature) as well as standing alert
and maternal clucking. The hens’ responses were clearly
reserved for when their chicks were experiencing the air
puff, rather than a generalized negative response.
Interestingly, a later study showed that the hens’
responses were not simply due to increased vocalizations
on the part of the chicks. The hens were responding to what
they knew about the aversive nature of the air puff and the
fact that it was being applied to their chicks. Their
responses were mediated by a number of complex cues
about whether the chicks were actually under threat,
requiring them to integrate information coming in with
their own knowledge of the stimulus in a potentially flex-
ible and context-dependent way (Edgar et al. 2013). These
findings not only provide evidence of emotional contagion
in the hens but support the notion that hens are capable of a
cognitively mediated empathic response. According to the
authors: ‘‘We found that adult female birds possess at least
one of the essential underpinning attributes of ‘empathy’;
the ability to be affected by, and share, the emotional state
of another’’ (http://bristol.ac.uk/news/2011/7525.html).
Follow-up studies examining the reactions of the chicks
to the air puff show that the mother can act as a ‘‘social
buffer’’ for the chicks, lessening their aversive reaction to
the stimulus. However, there are individual differences
across mother hens in their effectiveness as social buffers,
with less emotional hens being better at buffering their
chicks’ stress reaction (Edgar et al. 2015). These findings
suggest that there are different ‘‘maternal styles’’ in mother
hens which may be based upon differences in personality
traits. Moreover, the social buffering observed in this study
is not dissimilar to the phenomenon of ‘‘social referencing’’
in humans and other complex mammals, whereby the
juvenile looks to the parent to determine how to respond
emotionally to various situations. Chick reactions are less
extreme when the hen’s responses are less extreme. Like-
wise, when a human child falls down, for instance, they
immediately look to the mother to determine whether they
should laugh or cry. The mother determines this by her own
response, which is then modeled by the child. More relaxed
parents tend to have more relaxed children over time
(Walden and Ogan 1988). The similarity between social
buffering and social referencing leaves open the possibility
that they are connected through related cognitive-emo-
tional-social capacities.
Personality
Personality refers to ‘‘those characteristics of individuals
that describe and account for temporally stable patterns of
affect, cognition, and behavior’’ (Gosling 2008, p. 986). Or
put another way, personality is a set of traits that differ
across individuals and are consistent over time. The con-
cept of personality is critically important for a complete
understand of animals (including humans) as individuals.
Instead of viewing other animals as one-dimensional,
interchangeable units within a species, recognition of per-
sonality in other animals allows us to accurately see them
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as complex individuals with multi-dimensional character-
istics. Furthermore, personality interacts with cognition
and emotion, intimately shaping behavior and performance
on a wide range of tasks.
Studies of personality in nonhuman animals have shown
that personality traits are ubiquitous in the animal king-
dom; a wide range of fish, birds, and mammals show
persistent individual differences that can be organized
along core personality dimensions, many of which overlap
with those found in humans (Gosling 2008; Gosling and
John 1999; Marino and Colvin 2015). Debate exists over
the number and types of dimensions needed to characterize
personality variation in most species of animals (Gosling
2008). In humans, there is broad agreement on a five-factor
model of personality that includes the dimensions of
openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness,
and neuroticism (McCrae and Costa 2008). Although some
authors prefer to refer to behavioral syndromes or tem-
perament in other animals (Reale et al. 2007), there is little
distinction between these phenomena and personalities as
observed and documented (Gosling 2008). With only slight
variation of meaning, the different labels refer to the same
category of phenomena. With that said, a number of avian
species have demonstrated personality traits, e.g., zebra
finches (Taeniopygia guttata) (David et al. 2011; Schuett
et al. 2011), great tits (Parus major) (Groothuis Ton and
Carere 2005), greylag geese (Kralj-Fiser et al. 2010)
mountain chickadees (Poecile gambeli) (Fox et al. (2009),
and Japanese quail, (Coturnix japonica) (Miller 2003;
Miller et al. 2006), to name just a few.
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence for indi-
vidual personalities in chickens from sanctuaries, small
farmers, and people who keep backyard chickens. And as
should be clear from the previous section, mother hens
show a range of individual maternal personality traits
which appear to affect the behavior of their chicks.
Additionally, in studies examining the relationship
between dominance status and personality traits in male
chickens, three personality traits emerge—boldness,
activity/exploration, and vigilance. In these studies, males
are assessed for personality in various settings, such as a
novel arena, and then placed together to determine how
these factors impact the establishment of social status.
Overall, the results demonstrate that when combatants are
evenly matched in size, personality plays a role in the
outcome of the challenge. Variation in several independent
personality traits can influence the ability of an individual
to obtain higher status. All three personality traits are
positively correlated with higher social status (Favati et al.
2014a, b). Further work, at sanctuaries perhaps, focused on
chicken personalities would clearly be of much interest to
ethologists interested in chickens.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have identified a wide range of scientifically
documented examples of complex cognitive, emotional,
communicative, and social behavior in domestic chickens
which should be the focus of further study. These capaci-
ties are, compellingly, similar to what we see in other
animals regarded as highly intelligent. They include:
1. Chickens possess a number of visual and spatial
capacities, arguably dependent upon mental represen-
tation, such as some aspects of Stage four object
permanence and illusory contours, on a par with other
birds and mammals.
2. Chickens possess some understanding of numerosity
and share some very basic arithmetic capacities with
other animals.
3. Chickens can demonstrate self-control and self-assess-
ment, and these capacities may indicate self-
awareness.
4. Chickens communicate in complex ways, including
through referential communication, which may depend
upon some level of self-awareness and the ability to
take the perspective of another animal. This capacity,
if present in chickens, would be shared with other
highly intelligent and social species, including
primates.
5. Chickens have the capacity to reason and make logical
inferences. For example, chickens are capable of
simple forms of transitive inference, a capability that
humans develop at approximately the age of seven.
6. Chickens perceive time intervals and may be able to
anticipate future events.
7. Chickens are behaviorally sophisticated, discriminat-
ing among individuals, exhibiting Machiavellian-like
social interactions, and learning socially in complex
ways that are similar to humans.
8. Chickens have complex negative and positive emo-
tions, as well as a shared psychology with humans and
other ethologically complex animals. They exhibit
emotional contagion and some evidence for empathy.
9. Chickens have distinct personalities, just like all
animals who are cognitively, emotionally, and behav-
iorally complex individuals.
This is not to imply that the cognitive mechanisms
underlying all of these apparent similarities are equivalent
across species. Nor does it imply that higher-level expla-
nations are always able to provide a thorough explanation
of cognitive mechanisms. In fact, higher-level cognition is,
unarguably, intertwined with more basic capacities and it
may be contended that they are inseparable in many ways.
Shettleworth (2010) argues that there is always an interplay
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between more fundamental cognitive mechanisms, e.g.,
associative learning, and other higher-level capacities, e.g.,
abstract thought, and that many human abilities derive
from very basic cognitive processes. But the present find-
ings do tell us that chickens, like other birds, are similar, in
many ways, to mammals in their ethological complexity
and that there are a number of findings that speak to the
possibility of more complex capacities in chickens than
heretofore recognized. These capacities serve as a list of
promising areas of study for the future, as each needs to be
explored further.
These findings come with a clear recommendation to
continue our exploration of chickens’ ethological com-
plexity within noninvasive, non-harmful, and more natu-
ralistic contexts. A shift in how we ask questions about
chicken psychology and behavior will, undoubtedly, lead
to even more accurate and richer data and a more authentic
understanding of who they really are.
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